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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040537-CA
v.
SCOTT DAVID FERRY,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for possession or use of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (West 2004), and
possession or use of drug paraphernalia, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (West
2004), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable William W. Barrett, presiding.1 This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence that defendant had the power and intent to
exercise dominion and control over a methamphetamine-tainted syringe found beneath his
feet?

1

Citations are made to the current code where no relevant distinctions exist from
the code at the time of the offense.

"[The reviewing court] will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing
the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for
which he or she was convicted.'" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 18, 10 P.3d 346 (citation
omitted). See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 19,999 P.2d 565 ("So long as some evidence and
reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, [the reviewing court] will not disturb
them."
Because he did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the trial court,
defendant claims the trial court committed plain error in submitting the case to the jury.
"[T]o establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency
was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury."
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^f 17. Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing
to move for a directed verdict. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first
time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162
(citation omitted).
2. Can this Court determine a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on an
inadequate record?

2

"Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of finding that counsel performed
effectively." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 16, 12 P.3d 92.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTE, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules control this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession or use of a controlled substance (Count I) and
unlawful possession of paraphernalia (Count II). R. 2-4. Trial was set for July 30,2003. R.
47. On July 25,2003, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, claiming his statements
were taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States . R. 77-79. The trial
court found that by filing the motion fewer than five days before trial, defendant waived
review of the motion under rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 197:6.
A jury convicted defendant of both charges. R. 134-135.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory term of imprisonment not to exceed
five years on Count I and to a term of 180 days in jail on Count II. R. 175-76. The court
ordered that term on Count I was to be served consecutively to a commitment on a federal
charge, but suspended the prison time and the jail time and placed defendant on probation.
R. 175-76.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 177.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS2
At2:00 a.m., onNovember 15,2002, Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff Kent Cameron
and another deputy were on duty in their patrol car at the Kearns Junior High School parking
lot, located near 40th West and 49th South. R. 197:12-14, 16. Deputy Cameron saw a car
driving north on 4015 West without any lights in the dark. R. 197:14. He exited the parking
lot and stopped the car. R. 197:15. As the car stopped, Deputy Cameron noticed the car had
four occupants. R. 197:15. He also observed "a lot of subtle movement," especially of the
driver, who appeared to bend forward and reach to the floor, as if placing something on the
floor under the seat. R. 197:15, 29, 34.
When the car came to a stop, Deputy Cameron exited his patrol car. As he approached
the driver, he again observed "nervous" movements—"a lot of looking over their shoulders
seeing what as going on." R. 197:16-17. The driver was Corey Park. R. 197:17. Defendant
was seated directly behind Park. R. 197:18. Candace Hernandez and Sarah Bizwell were also
passengers. Sarah had a long history of drug abuse. R. 197:34, 42, 46. Deputy Cameron
ordered all four out of the car. R. 197:18. As defendant raised his feet and stepped out,
Deputy Cameron noticed a syringe on the rear passenger's floorboard near defendant's feet,
closer to the back seat than to the front seat. R. 197:18-19, 34. He did not recall any clutter
on the floor and thought the car was fairly clean. R. 197:20.

2

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (reviewing challenge to sufficiency of
evidence in light most favorable to jury's verdict).
4

Deputy Cameron asked defendant about the syringe. R. 197:20. Defendant said that
he knew the syringe was there, but that he did not know who it belonged to. R. 197:20.
Deputy Cameron did not ask defendant how long the syringe had been there, nor did he ask
Park when he last cleaned the car or who was in it earlier in the day. R. 197:35.
Deputy Cameron searched the car. R. 197:22. Three inches beneath the driver's seat
he found a wooden box within which was a plastic bag containing marijuana. R. 197:23-24.
Park admitted that the box and its contents belonged to him. R. 197:24.3
The syringe tested positive for methamphetamine. R. 197:26. Deputy Cameron stated
that it was not regular police practice to take fingerprints off items like the syringe. R.
197:24. He did not test the syringe for blood or for DNA, again according to practice for
such an item. R. 197:35-36. He did not check defendant's or any occupant's arms for needle
marks, observing that drugs can be injected anywhere on the body. R. 197:27-28,33. He did
not take any photographs of the occupants or request any of them to take a drug test. R.
197:33-34.
Deputy Cameron arrested defendant and placed him in his patrol car. R. 197:27.
While transporting defendant to the jail, Deputy Cameron had a conversation with defendant
in which he answered some of defendant's questions and then asked defendant questions in
3

Park was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine in a school
zone. R. 197:30. Park's father, Todd Park, is a detective in the Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office. R. 197:32. However, the trial court sustained the prosecution's
objection to defendant's question about whether Park's case was dismissed. R. 197:30-32.
Therefore, contrary to defendant's assertion, see Aplt. Br. at 6, 20, there is no evidence
that Park's case was dismissed or that the police department gave Park improper,
preferential treatment because of his father's position.
5

response. R. 197:27, 39-40. Defendant told the deputy that he had been addicted to drugs,
that methamphetamine was his drug of choice, and that he had taken a hit of the drug ten
hours earlier. R. 197:27. Defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights before giving his
statements. R. 197:39
Defendant acknowledged that as their car was stopped Park crouched down and tried
to "stash stuff.55 R. 197:45. Defendant claimed that Deputy Cameron did look for needle
marks on his arms, but there were none. R. 197:46. Defendant asserted that while being
transported to the jail he and Deputy Cameron talked about drug use. R. 197:47. During the
conversation, defendant admitted that he used drugs and that his drug of choice was
methamphetamine, but denied that the syringe was his. R. 197:47. Defendant denied ever
saying that he had used drugs ten hours earlier or that he was an addict. R. 197:47.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The evidence and the reasonable inferences from that evidence were sufficient to
prove that defendant had constructive possession ("the power and intent to exercise dominion
and control55) over the methamphetamine-tainted syringe found at his feet when he exited the
car. Defendant, an automobile passenger, and his companions made nervous movements as
the deputy approached their car, and the syringe was only discovered as defendant raised his
feet to exit the car. Defendant admitted that methamphetamine was his drug of choice, that
he was aware that the syringe was at his feet, that he was addicted to drugs, and that he had
ingested methamphetamine ten hours earlier. Defendant's proximity to and preference for
6

methamphetamine reasonably suggested that the syringe belonged to him rather than to the
driver, who admitted that marijuana, a distinctly different drug found beneath the driver's
seat, belonged to him. Given this evidence, defendant fails to establish that the evidence
was so obviously insufficient that the trial court committed plain error in submitting the case
to the jury. His claim of ineffective assistance, based on his trial counsel's failure to move
for a directed verdict, fails for the same reason.
POINT II
Defendant's claim, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to timely move to
suppress statements allegedly taken in violation of his Miranda rights, fails for lack of record
support. It is arguable that counsel performed deficiently in filing the motion late. However,
defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance. Although
defendant made incriminating statements without benefit of Miranda warnings while he was
in custody, there is no record to support that those statements were the result of interrogation
or its functional equivalent. Without a supporting record, defendant cannot show that his
motion to suppress would have been granted even if it had been timely filed. Consequently,
defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by his un-Mirandized remarks.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM THAT
EVIDENCE WERE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT
HAD THE POWER AND INTENT TO EXERCISE DOMINION AND
CONTROL OVER THE SYRINGE FOUND AT HIS FEET
Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error in sending the case to the jury
because the evidence was obviously insufficient to support his convictions for possession of
drugs and paraphernalia.

Aplt. Br. at 8-21. Specifically, defendant argues that the

circumstantial evidence was plainly insufficient to show that he constructively possessed the
syringe containing methamphetamine. Aplt. Br. at 9-21. The claim fails because the fully
marshaled evidence is sufficient to show that defendant constructively possessed the
methamphetamine-tainted syringe, and if not, any insufficiency was not so obvious or
fundamental as to constitute a basic miscarriage of justice by submitting it to the jury.
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a directed
verdict. Aplt. Br. at 22. That claims fails because a reasonable attorney could have believed
the evidence was sufficient to resist such a motion, thereby rendering it futile.
A. Because evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant
possessed drugs and paraphernalia, the trial court did
not plainly err in sending the case to the jury.
The Plain Error Standard. To establish plain error on a sufficiency of the evidence
claim, "defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and

8

fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT
74, f 17. "To determine whether there was sufficient evidence to convict a defendant, [the
reviewing court] do[es] not examine whether [it] believe[s] that the evidence at trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18. "Rather, [the
reviewing court] will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for
which he or she was convicted.'" Id. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah
1993)). Only if this Court concludes that the evidence was insufficient must it then
"determine whether the evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain
error to submit the case to the jury." Id
The Constructive Possession Standard. The Utah Controlled Substances Act makes
it unlawful to "knowingly and intentionally [] possess or use a controlled substance." UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (West 2004). Similarly, the Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act

makes it illegal to "possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to . . . ingest . . . a
controlled substance." UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004). "To prove that
defendant was in knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance, the
prosecution need only establish that the produced contraband was found in a place or under
circumstances indicating that the accused had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion
and control over it." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). "Actual physical
9

possession presupposes knowing and intentional possession." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,318
(Utah 1985). However, "[ujnlawful possession does not necessarily mean that the substance
be found on the person of the accused or that he have sole and exclusive possession thereof."
State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981); accord Fox, 709 P.2d at 318-319. "A
conviction may also be based on constructive possession." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319.
To establish constructive possession, the State must "prove that there was a sufficient
nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both the
power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." Id. at 319; accord
State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, % 15, 985 P.2d 911 (citing Fox); Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132
(holding that "[t]here must be some additional nexus between the accused and the
contraband"). Whether such a nexus exists depends on "the unique facts and circumstances
of each case which establish the requisite connection between an accused and the
[contraband]." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). Mere knowledge of the
whereabouts of equipment or precursors or occupancy in their same location, however,
without other proof of intent to use or control them, does not prove constructive possession.
See Fox, 709 P.2d at 319. Rather, "the evidence 'must raise a reasonable inference that..
. defendant was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander.'" Spanish Fork
City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, K 7, 975 P.2d 501 (quoting Fox, 709 P.2d 319-20). A
determination of constructive possession is based on the totality of the circumstances. State
v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 788-89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).

10

Defendant claims that because all the evidence that he possessed the syringecontaining methamphetamine was circumstantial, evidence supporting his convictions "must
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence... because the existence of a reasonable
hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt."
Aplt. Br. at 10 (quoting State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion), and
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976)). The State does not dispute that the
evidence in support of defendant's constructive possession was based only on circumstantial
evidence. However, since the issuance of Hill and Romero, both this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have stated that even in a case of circumstantial evidence the reasonable
doubt standard does not require the reasonable-altemative-hypothesis formulation. State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 n.l (Utah 1992) (alternative reasonable hypothesis is but one
way of expressing reasonable doubt requirement); State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah
1997) (finding guilt beyond reasonable doubt in case of circumstantial evidence without
recourse to requested alternative reasonable hypothesis instruction); State v. Layman, 1999
UT 79, % 2,985 P.2d 911 (finding court of appeals' discussion of the reasonable alternative
hypothesis discussion in State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), "problematic
and unnecessary," but upholding conclusion that evidence was insufficient); State v.
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that a jury verdict of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt "necessarily... exclude[s] every other reasonable hypothesis.")
Rather than that the State's case preclude every alternative reasonable hypothesis, the court
reviewing a charge based on circumstantial evidence "'must determine (1) whether there is
11

any evidence that supports each and every element of the crime charged, and (2) whether the
inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human
experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)). '"A
guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt.555 Id (quoting Workman, 852 P.2d at 985).
Instructions requiring the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on both
counts were given and are not challenged on appeal. R. 112, 118, 125.
The Relevant Facts. Here, defendant was a passenger in a legally stopped car with
three other people. R. 197:15, 18.4 As the car stopped, the deputy observed "a lot of subtle
movement,55 among all of the car's occupants. He also noticed that the driver appeared to
bend forward and reach to the floor, as if placing something on the floor under the seat. R.
197:15,29,34. As the deputy approached the car, he again observed the occupants nervously
looking over their shoulders. R. 197:16-17. Defendant was seated directly behind the driver.
R. 197:18. The deputy ordered all of the occupants out of the car. R. 197:18. As defendant
raised his feet and stepped out, the deputy noticed a syringe on the rear passenger's
floorboard near defendant's feet, closer to the back seat than to the front seat. R. 197:18-19,
34. The syringe was later found to contain methamphetamine. R. 197:26. Defendant
admitted that he knew the syringe was there, although he denied knowing whom it belonged

4

Defendant nowhere disputes that the car was legally stopped for driving without
headlights.
12

to. R. 197:20. The deputy also found beneath the driver's seat a wooden box containing a
plastic bag of marijuana, all of which the driver admitted were his. R. 197:23-24.
While being transported to the jail, defendant told the deputy that he had been
addicted to drugs, that methamphetamine was his drug of choice, and that he had taken a hit
of the drug ten hours earlier. R. 197:27.
Based on these facts and the fair inferences therefrom, the jury reasonably concluded
that defendant possessed the syringe and the methamphetamine it contained.
The Marshaling Standard. A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
"must marshal all of the evidence in support of the [verdict] and then demonstrate that the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
[verdict] against an attack." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, % 11, 999 P.2d 1252
(quotations and citation omitted); see also State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355,16, 36 P.3d
533 (holding defendant "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the [defendant]
resists") (citing West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App.
1991)); Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315 ("After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.").
Applying the marshaling standard in a jury setting, the appellate court will review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and reverse "only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must

13

have entertained a reasonable doubt[.]" State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989). See
also State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
"The existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not warrant
disturbing the jury's verdict." State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). Moreover, it is
within the exclusive province of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence. Id; State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah Ct App. 1990).
This Case. Here, defendant has failed to marshal all the evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from that evidence in support of the jury's verdict. First, defendant
asserts that he made no furtive movements of any kind. Aplt. Br. at 17. However, he has
failed to marshal evidence that as the car came to a stop and Deputy Cameron approached
it, he observed all the occupants of the car making "a lot of subtle movements]" and
"nervous[ly]" looking over their shoulders. R. 197:15,17. Additionally, defendant has failed
to marshal the evidence that the deputy did not see the syringe until defendant raised his feet
to step out of the car. R. 197:18-19, 34. From these unmarshaled facts, a juror could
reasonably have inferred that defendant was attempting to conceal the syringe until asked
to exit the car. See State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386,1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (nondefendant
rear passenger's "mov[ing] around was "furtive" gesture suggesting he, not defendant driver,
had control of drugs found in back seat). See also Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125,137
(D.C. Cir. 2001) ("a furtive gesture indicating an attempt to . . . hide . . . the object," may be
the "comparatively minimal" additional evidence proving constructive possession where
contraband is found in an automobile in plain view and conveniently accessible to a
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passenger defendant); Person v. State, 661 N.E.2d 587, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (rear
passenger's reaching behind his back was furtive gesture suggesting attempt to hide gun
found in rear seat cushion); Commonwealth v. Whitlock, 658 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1995) (recognizing that attempts to conceal contraband permit an inference of unlawful
possession). Additionally, defendant fails to marshal the evidence that Park, the driver,
admitted possession of marijuana found only beneath the driver's seat. R. 197:23-24.
Defendant, by contrast, was seated in the rear seat in immediate proximity to, and aware of,
the syringe containing the methamphetamine, a distinctly different drug and the drug of
defendant's choice. R. 197:19, 27. From this evidence, a juror could reasonably have
inferred that the marijuana belonged only to Park and that the syringe belonged only to
defendant.
Because defendant has not marshaled all the supportive evidence and viewed it and
all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, his
claim may be rejected on that ground alone. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 17,1 P.3d
1108 (quotingStafe v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, \ 13,983 P.2d 556); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d
470, 473 (Utah App. 1991).
Sufficient Evidence of Constructive Possession. Even if the Court were to reach
defendant's claim, the evidence is sufficient. In Layman, this Court recited "some of the key
factual determinations which have supported findings of constructive possession" in other
cases of apparent nonexclusive possession: "1) defendant's presence at the time the drugs
were found, with emphasis on the fact that the drugs were in plain or open view; 2) the
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defendant's access to the drugs; 3) the proximity of defendant to the drugs; 4) evidence
indicating that the defendant was participating with others in the mutual use and enjoyment
of the contraband; and 5) incriminating statements." Layman, 953 P.2d 782 at 788 (citting
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1983)).
Applying these factors, the evidence strongly indicates that defendant constructively
possessed the syringe. The syringe was found in the immediate vicinity of defendant's feet
and was in plain view as defendant exited the car. R. 197:18-19,26,34. Defendant admitted
that he knew the syringe was there. R. 197:20. Defendant admitted that methamphetamine
was his drug of choice and that he had used the drug ten hours earlier. R. 197:27.
Additionally, as stated, the evidence supported reasonable inferences that defendant was
attempting to hide the syringe before he was asked to exit the car and that it belonged to him
rather than to the driver, based on their interest in different drugs. In sum, the foregoing
evidence demonstrates a sufficient nexus between defendant and the syringe to permit an
inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control
over the syringe and the methamphetamine it contained.
Nevertheless, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence demonstrating his
constructive possession of contraband and paraphernalia by comparing and contrasting the
evidence in this case with the evidence in three reported cases: State v. Layman (Utah Court
of Appeals' decision), State v. Salas, and Spanish Fork City v. Bryan. Aplt. Br. at 10-19.
Contrary to defendant's argument, the evidence supporting constructive possession is
stronger in this case than in those defendant relies on.
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In Layman, the defendant drove from Ogden to Vernal with his father, Hobart, and
his father's friend, Gina, both of whom intended to sell drugs at their destination. Layman,
953 P.2d at 784. In Vernal, Hobart gave Gina a pouch containing drugs. Id. After dropping
Hobart off at his sister's house in Vernal, Layman was stopped by police for faulty taillights.
Id. In the process of stopping, Layman jerked the car to the right and left, coming to rest
perpendicular to the police car. Id. Layman was anxious and fidgety, his eyes red,
bloodshot, watery, and glassy. Id. Layman was later observed to be under the influence of
a stimulant and to have needle marks on his arms; he also tested positive for
methamphetamine in his blood. Id. at 785. When the police attempted to obtain the pouch
from Gina, she repeatedly looked nervously toward Layman, who at one point shook his
head in a negative fashion back and forth. Id. at 784. When the police did obtain the pouch,
it was found to contain paraphernalia, including scales and a large baggy of
methamphetamine. Id. Layman was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and possession of
paraphernalia. Id. at 785.
This Court reversed Layman's drug and paraphernalia convictions. M a t 792. The
Court found that despite ample evidence that Layman was under the influence of drugs, no
evidence showed that he had used the drugs being transported or knew of Hobart and Gina's
criminal intentions.

M a t 790-91.

Although Layman's head shake might indicate

knowledge and some type of control of the drugs and paraphernalia in Gina's pouch, there
were other plausible explanations for Layman's conduct. Id. at 791. Additionally, there was
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no evidence that Layman attempted to flee, he denied the presence of drugs, and no drugs
were found on his person. Id. at 790. Thus, the evidence was insufficent to prove the
"pivotal fact," that Layman was a knowing participant in a criminal enterprise. Id. at 791.
On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court held that the only fact tending to show
Layman's control over drugs and paraphernalia in the pouch, the shaking of his head in
negative fashion, was "not enough" and that none of the other evidence did anything to
address that critical factual issue. Layman, 1999 UT 79 at f 16.
Here, defendant's conduct and admissions and the other circumstances of the case
demonstrate his knowledge of and control over the methamphetamine and syringe more
substantially than the defendant in Layman, Unlike Layman, defendant admitted knowing
the syringe was on the floor beneath his feet, and a reasonable inference from the evidence
suggested that the methamphetamine belonged to him and not to the driver. R. 197:20.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, see Aplt. Br. at 18, neither this Court's nor the supreme
court's opinion in Layman asserts that Layman "apparently" knew of the presence of drugs.
Additionally, unlike Layman, defendant's nervous movements, his proximity to the syringe,
and the possibility that he was concealing the syringe reasonably suggest that he was in
control of it. Most tellingly, defendant was in immediate proximity to the syringe, whereas
in Layman, someone else and not Layman was in possession of the contraband and
paraphernalia. The same facts distinguish this case from the other cases cited by defendant.
Compare State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (evidence of
constructive possession of drugs found in crack of rear seat cushion insufficient where
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supported only by unidentified informant's tip and discovery of drugs in location where
another passenger, moving furtively, had much easier and more immediate access); Spanish
Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61,ffl[,975 P.2d 501 (evidence of constructive possession
based only on discovery of drugs and evidence of their use in home shared by defendant and
her husband insufficient to show knowledge and control).
In contradistinction to Layman , S alas, and Bryan , other courts have found a
defendant to be in constructive possession of drugs in circumstances similar to this case. In
Brown v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 773 (Va. Ct. App. 1988), a detective, while executing
a search warrant, briefly observed the defendant in the bedroom seated on a stool next to the
bed. Id. at 773. Another detective saw defendant exiting the bedroom. Id. at 774. No drugs
or paraphernalia were found on the defendant's person. Id. However, on the bed, the police
found a mirror with cocaine on it and a large amount of cocaine. Id. Defendant and other
suspects were seated within arms reach of the drugs. Id. Defendant admitted using cocaine
in the past, but denied that he presently used it. Id. Based on the defendant's immediate
proximity to the drugs, his knowledge of their presence, and his presence in the house for
about an hour, the court found the evidence sufficient to show that the cocaine was subject
to his dominion and control. Id. at 775.
Instate v. Powell, 973 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), the defendant was the front
passenger in a car stopped for speeding. Id. at 557. All the occupants appeared nervous and
"spaced out," and a strong smell of marijuana emanated from inside the car Id. at 557-58.
The officer noticed the defendant moving his foot on the floorboard toward the passenger
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seat. Id. at 558. He also noticed the corner of a plastic bag containing a green leafy
substance protruding from underneath the passenger seat. Id. At trial, the defendant's wife
testified that the car belonged to her brother and that her husband did not know that
marijuana was in the vehicle. Id. at 559. Nevertheless, the defendant's "ready access" to
the marijuana, his visible nervousness, his attempts to conceal the marijuana, and his use of
marijuana before the stop established sufficient circumstantial evidence to support an
inference of constructive possession. Id.
The evidence of defendant's constructive possession in this case is comparable
Powell's. Like Powell, defendant here was in immediate proximity to contraband, he acted
nervously, he may reasonably have been viewed as attempting to hide the syringe, and he
denied that the syringe belonged to him. Evidence that Powell had smoked the marijuana
found in the car is admittedly stronger than defendant's acknowledgment that he had used
methamphetamine ten hours earlier. However, that discrepancy is counterbalanced by
defendant's admission that he knew the syringe was at his feet. In sum, relevant case law
supports that defendant constructively possessed the syringe and the methamphetamine it
contained.
Lack of Obvious, Fundamental Error. Finally, defendant has failed to show that the
trial court committed plain error in submitting the case to the jury. Under the plain error test,
defendant must show that any insufficiency must have been apparent to the trial court; that
is, "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in
submitting it to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at Tf 17. Explaining "fundamental error,"
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as a defining characteristic of plain error, the Fourth Circuit stated that plain error is a
"fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice
cannot have been done," or "where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a
fundamental right of the accused," or the error has "resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice or in
the denial to appellant of a fair trial," or where the error is such as to "seriously affect the
fairness, integrity or public reputation ofjudicial proceedings." United States v. McCaskill,
676 F.2d 995,1002 (4th Cir.) (applying the federal plain error rule, Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) to
claim of instructional error), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S. Ct. 381 (1982).
Defendant's plain error claim fails under the foregoing standard. None of the cases
relied on by defendant were scrutinized under the plain error standard. The substantial
evidence establishing that defendant exercised dominion and control over the syringe and
reasonable inferences from that evidence show that any insufficiency could not have been
so apparent to the trial court that it plainly erred in submitting this case to the jury.
R. Defendant fails to show that his trial counsel was ineffective in
not moving for a directed verdict or that he was prejudiced.
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] must show
that (1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) there exists a reasonable
probability that absent the deficient conduct, the outcome would likely have been more
favorable to [defendant]." State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, ^ 21, 9 P.3d 777 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693 (1984)).

To prove deficient

performance, "appellant must demonstrate that counsel's actions were not conscious trial
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strategy, and that there was a lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions."
State v. Windward, 941 P.2d 627,633 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations and internal quotations
omitted). "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but
must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993).
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6, 89 P.3d 162 (citation omitted).
"Because of the 'distorting effects of hindsight,' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at
2065, appellate review of trial counsel's performance must be highly deferential in order to
prevent the temptation to second-guess counsel's actions based on a lifeless record." Id.
"When evaluating whether the State produced sufficient 'believable evidence' to
withstand a challenge at the close of the State's case in chief [ i.e., a motion for a directed
verdict], we apply the same standard used when reviewing a jury verdict." State v. Hamilton,
2003 UT 22,f 41, 70 P.3d 111. "Hence, [sufficient] evidence in this context means the
evidence must be 'capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id.
(quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,\ 15, 20 P.3d 300). "[A] motion for a directed verdict
made at the close of the state's case may be denied if the trial court finds that the state has
established a 'prima facie case against the defendant by producing "believable evidence of
all the elements of the crime charged.'"" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, \ 29, 84 P.3d 1183
(citations omitted). "The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the state."
Id. (citations omitted). "When evaluating a motion for a directed verdict '"the court is not

22

free to weigh the evidence and thus invade the province of the jury, whose prerogative it is
to judge the facts.""' Id. at \ 32 (citations omitted).
Defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails under both prongs of the Strickland
standard. First, defendant merely speculates that his counsel's failure to move for a directed
verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief constituted deficient performance. Given the
formidable showing necessary to succeed on a motion for a directed verdict and the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting defendant's constructive possession of the
methamphetamine-tainted syringe, counsel might reasonably have viewed the evidence as
not so plainly insufficient as to justify taking the case from the jury. However, even if
counsel was deficient in failing to move for a directed verdict, the omission was harmless.
See State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 26,1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."). Additionally, counsel's failure to move for
a directed verdict is not an error "so obvious and fundamental," given the sufficiency of the
evidence, that defendant was prejudiced by allowing the court to submit the case to the jury.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 17. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
("When defendant raises the issues of both plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel,
'a common standard is applicable.'") (citation omitted).
In sum, because there was sufficient evidence of defendant's constructive possession
of the syringe, defendant's counsel was not ineffective in not moving for a directed verdict.
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POINT II
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT
HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO
TIMELY CHALLENGE STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY TAKEN IN
VIOLATION OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS
Defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to timely move to suppress
statements allegedly taken in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486,
86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Aplt. Br. at 23-29. Defendant further asserts that he was prejudiced
when Deputy Cameron interrogated him without giving him Miranda warnings and thereby
elicited incriminating statements about his use of methamphetamine. Aplt. Br. at 25-28.
This claim fails because the record does not support that defendant's incriminating
statements were the result of interrogation or its functional equivalent. Without a supporting
record, defendant cannot show that his motion to suppress would have been granted even if
it had been timely filed. Consequently, defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by his
xm-Mirandized remarks.
Factual Background of Untimely Suppression Motion.

On July 25, 2003,

defendant's trial counsel filed a motion to suppress alleging that police obtained statements
from defendant without first giving him Miranda warnings. R. 77-78. The motion alleged
that after defendant was arrested and was being transported to jail he spontaneously stated
that he could not go to jail. R. 78. The motion further alleged that following defendant's
spontaneous remarks the deputy continued to engage defendant in conversation, at some
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point asking what defendant's drug of choice was and when was the last time was he had
used it. R. 78.
On June 30, 2003, the court set trial for July 29 and 30. R. 35-36. At a pretrial
conference on July 21, trial was reset for July 30 only. R. 47. Before trial, the court
addressed defendant's motion to suppress. R. 197:3. Defense counsel acknowledged that the
motion was filed late because it was not filed five days before trial. R. 197:3.5 Counsel also
acknowledged that the untimely filing of the motion was not trial strategy. R. 197:6. The
trial court denied the motion as untimely under rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
R. 197:6. The court also refused to continue the trial to take testimony on the motion because
of the untimely filing. R. 197:6-7. Defendant does not challenge the court's rulings on
appeal.
At trial, Deputy Cameron briefly testified as to defendant's incriminating statements
and the circumstances in which he made them, discussed below. R. 197:27, 39-40.
The Standard of Review. As set out above, to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and
that the deficient performance prejudiced him. "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez, 870 P.2d at
5

Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that a motion to suppress be
filed "at least five days prior to trial." Utah R. Crim. P. 12 (c)(1)(B). Rule 2(a), Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that "[w]hen a period of time prescribed . . . is less
that 11 days, intermediate Saturdays [and] Sundays . . . shall not be included in the
computation." In 2003, there was a Saturday and Sunday between the filing of
defendant's motion to suppress on July 25 (Friday) and trial on July 30 (Wednesday).
Thus, counsel filed the motion only 1 day prior to trial.
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877. "[W]here, on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was ineffective
. . . , defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." State v. Litherland,
2000 UT 76, ^ 16, 12 P.3d 92 (clarifying that if "defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support
a determination that counsel was ineffective,'... defendant bears the primary obligation and
burden of moving for a temporary remand [under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure]") (quoting rule 23B). "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion,
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of finding
that counsel performed effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at Tfl6. See also State v.
Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 964-65 & n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("However, the record is not
adequate for us to review defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance. The trial record
provides us with none of the facts necessary to establish whether counsel's alleged omissions
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.")
The Miranda Requirements. "Police officers must provide Miranda warnings prior
to subjecting a suspect to a 'custodial interrogation,' which is defined as 'questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396,
If 10, 101 P.3d 846 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612). "[T]he Supreme
Court [has also] stated that the 'Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.'" State v.
Dutchie, 969 P.2d422,426 (Utah 1998) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,300-01,
26

100 S. Ct. 1682,1689-90 (1980)). "That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda
refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.'" Id. (quoting
Innis, at 300-01,100 S. Ct. at 1689-90). "The [Supreme] Court further stated that'since the
police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or
actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of
police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.'" State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 545 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Innis, at 302,
100 S. Ct. at 1690) (emphasis in original).
Innis and its progeny make clear that even in the absence of Miranda warnings, a
defendant's volunteered or spontaneous statements, even when made while the defendant is
in custody, are not received in violation of Miranda. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.
Ct. at 1630 ("Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and
their admissibility is not affected by [Miranda].") In Yoder, as with defendant here, the
defendant made incriminating statements without benefit of Miranda warnings after he was
arrested and being transported to jail. Yoder, 935 P.2d at 543-45. Although the officer
responded to defendant's rambling incriminatory remarks, this Court refused to suppress the
statements. Id. at 546. The Court held that the officer "did not make any comments that
he should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and thus
did not engage in the functional equivalent of express police questioning." Id. See also
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Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 426 (refusing to suppress "voluntary [and] spontaneous" statements
made when, in response to a inquiry about his age, the defendant "launched" into an
incriminating monologue); State v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 271, ffif 14-17, 987 P.2d 1281
(same).
This Case. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel was deficient in failing to timely
file a motion to suppress defendant's incriminating statements, defendant nevertheless cannot
prevail on the second prong of his claim because he has not developed a sufficient record on
appeal to establish that he was prejudiced. Defendant was in custody when he made his
incriminating statements. However, the record is inadequate to show that defendant's
incriminating statements stemmed from an interrogation or its functional equivalent.
Therefore, defendant cannot show that his motion to suppress would have been granted and,
consequently, that he was prejudiced.
Defendant's suppression motion alleged that he "voluntarily and spontaneously"
stated that he could not go to jail. R. 78. Thereafter, Deputy Cameron continued to engage
him in conversation and then at some point asked him, without giving him Miranda
warnings, what defendant's drug of choice was and when he had last used it. R. 78.
Defendant relied on the preliminary hearing transcript and a police report to show that he had
not been advised of his Miranda rights. R. 78. However, the motion was not supported by
an affidavit, preliminary hearing transcript, or police report.
More importantly, neither Deputy Cameron's nor defendant's trial testimony confirms
that defendant's remarks were the result of interrogation or its functional equivalent. At trial,
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Deputy Cameron's testimony neither establishes not implies that he interrogated defendant:
Q [Prosecutor]: Did you have a conversation with [defendant] while you
were en route to the jail?
A: I did.
Q: Did he say anything about drug use?
A: He says [sic] he's been addicted to drugs and had a problem with
drugs for the past few years. His drug of choice was meth and he—
the last time he had a hit or a dose of meth was ten hours ago,
prior to me [sic] making contact with him.
R. 197:27. It is impossible to tell from this testimony whether defendant's statements were
voluntary and spontaneous or the result of interrogation or its equivalent.
On cross-examination, defendant sought to challenge Deputy Cameron's credibility
with his failure to obtain a signed statement concerning defendant's incriminating remarks
and with the police report. R. 197:36-39. However, when the trial court inquired of counsel
if she really wanted the deputy to repeat defendant's "exact" words from the report "wordfor-word," counsel withdrew the question. R. 39. The cross-examination then proceeded as
follows:
Q [Ms. Hanseen]: Did you advise Mr. Ferry of his Miranda rights?

A: I did not.
Q: And you asked him some questions?
A: I answered some questions and asked him some questions pertaining
to those questions he asked me.
Q: You say in your report you asked him what his drug of choice was.
29

The Court: You're going to—you're going to open this thing up and he's
going to be able to tell everything.
Ms. Hanseen: Very well.
R. 197:39-40.
On direct examination, defendant testified as follows:
Q [Ms. Hanseen]: And on the way to jail, did you have a conversation
with the officer?
A: I did.
Q: Tell the jury about that conversation. I think they're interested in knowing
what that was.
A: We were just talking about drug use and I told him that I—that I did use
drugs and that my drug of choice was meth, but that wasn't—wasn't my
needle in the car.
R. 197:47.
The foregoing evidence is inadequate to show that defendant's incriminating
statements were the product of interrogation. Defendant and Deputy Cameron had a
conversation concerning defendant's drug use. The deputy also answered and then asked
some questions pertaining to questions defendant had asked the deputy. That record does not
show that defendant's incriminating remarks were not spontaneous, or that they were made
after Deputy Cameron asked and answered some questions about defendant's drug use, or
that the deputy's questions and answers even had anything to do with defendant's drug use.
In fact, defendant admits that he made "voluntary and spontaneous" statements, raising the
possibility that his statements or conversation about his drug use were also spontaneous. R.
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78; 197:40. See Yoder, 935 P.2d at 544-46 (concluding that officer's back-and-forth "banter"
with the defendant was not a "conversation" that was the functional equivalent of
interrogation). Finally, because defendant withdrew his question before receiving a response,
there is no evidence from the police report that Deputy Cameron actually asked defendant
what his drug of choice was. R. 197:40.
Defendant never moved for a rule 23B remand to develop a record that would clearly
show that the his statements were the result of an interrogation or its functional equivalent.
In sum, defendant has failed to develop a record that shows that his incriminating
remarks were the product of interrogation or its functional equivalent. Consequently,
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for lack of any showing of
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this Court
affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ]\_ day of February, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KENNETH BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

31

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
were mailed, postage prepaid, this /(

day of February, 2005 to:

Margaret P. Lindsay
99 East Center Street
P.O. Box 1895
Orem, Utah 840059-1895
Patrick V. Lindsay
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200

32

